Universal and Existential Interpretations of Donkey Sentences
The classical analysis of donkey sentences like (1.a,b) in Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) assigns them truth conditions as given in (2.a). That is, they are treated as quantifications over farmer-donkey pairs. Partee (1984) and Kadmon (1987) have pointed out that the proper reading of (1.b), and a preferred reading of (La), is rather a quantification over fa rmers, as illustrated in (2.b). (2.a) is called the symmetric interpretation, and (2.b) the (subject-) asymmetric interpretation by Kadmon (1987) . In (2.b), the donkey variable y is called de pendent. With asymmetric interpretations the question arises how the dependent variable is interpreted within the second argument, the nuclear scope. This issue is taken up in Rooth (1987) . He distinguishes two cases, a "weak" or existential interpretation as in (3.a), and a "strong" or universal interpretation as in (3.b) . 1 2. Upward-and Downward-Entailing Contexts Rooth (1987) observes that there is a correlation between existential and universal interpretation of the dependent variable and the quantifier of the donkey sentence:
Quantifiers like every and most favor an existential interpretation, quantifiers like no favor a universal interpretation:
(4) a. Every fanner that owns a donkey beats it. In typical circumstances 2 , a sentence like (4.a) would be considered false if there is some fanner that does not beat all of his donkeys, and a sentence like (4.b) would be considered fa lse if there is some fanner that beats one of his donkeys, even ifhe does not beat his other donkeys. One crucial property that distinguishes quantifiers like every and most on the one hand and no on the other is that every and most are upward entailing in their nuclear scope, whereas no is downward entailing. Hence a promising hy pothesis is that quantifiers that are upward entailing prefer the existential interpre tation of the dependent variable, whereas downward entailing quantifiers prefer the universal interpretation. Kanazawa ( 1994) calls this Rooth's Generalization. Other examples that confirm this hypothesis can be fo und easily. The fo llowing downward-entailing quantifiers clearly prefer the existential interpretation of the dependent variable. For example, (5.a) says that few fann ers who own a donkey beat any of their donkeys.
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(5) a. Few fann ers who own a donkey beat it. b. At most three fann ers who own a donkey beat it.
Kanazawa points out a problem with Rooth's Generalization: The quanti fier not every, though downward entailing in its standard analysis (6.b), does not behave as expected. Sentence (6.a) expresses that there is at least one fanner that does not beat any of his donkeys, that is, the dependent variable is interpreted universally:
(6) a. Not every farm er who owns a donkey beats it.
Not every, analyzed as a quantificational determiner, is a proportional determiner that is downward entailing in its nuclear scope; a sentence like Not every A B ex presses that less than 100 percent of the A have the property B. Interestingly, other quantifiers of this type abide by Rooth's Generalization. For example, less than 90 percent of the clearly prefers the existential interpretation of the depend-ent variable. Sentence (7.a) says that less than 90 percent of the farm ers who own a donkey beat any donkey that they have. The same point could be made with the detenniner less than 100 percent of the, which should be synonymous with not every, under the usual interpretation.
a. Less than 90 percent of the farm ers who own a donkey beat it.
I would like to propose that not every, contrary to received opinion, cannot be rendered by the logical constant NOTEVERY defined in (6.b). Rather, sentences of the fo rm not every A B are primarily used to deny an explict or implicit univer sal claim of the meaning EVERY(II AII, IIBID. In this they are similar to sentences of the form It is not the case that S, or It is not true that S, which are typically used to deny an explicit or implicit claim II SI I. This is obvious in the case of contrastive negation, when the contituent every is in fo cus, but also holds in other cases. In contrast, the truth-conditionally equivalent quantifier less than 100 percent of the cannot be used as easily in this way : (8) a. A: All the politicans are crooks. They just work for their own pocket. b. B: Well, not every politician wants to enrich himself. Other examples of total/partial predicates are clean/dirty, healthy/sick. dry/wet, Ja il/pass, smooth/rugged, and emptylfilled.
Without doubt. the total vs. partial interpretations of predicates like closed and open is an important phenomenon of semantic interpretation that has not yet received the attention it deserves. However. it seems that it is not strictly a lexical property, as Yoon (1994) has proposed. For imagine the fo llowing situation: The local bank has a safe that is accessible only through a hallway with three doors, all of which must be open to reach the safe. Under the given circumstances, (12.a) expresses the fa ct that all the doors were open, whereas (12.b) expresses the fa ct that at least some of the doors were closed. As the totality vs. partiality of the interpretation is shifting with the con text, it cannot be just a lexical property.
Here I will not try to develop a theory of total and partial interpretations of predicates. Regardless how their semantic behavior will ultimately be explained, Yoon ( 1994) observes that those predicates show similar differences in interpreta tion with donkey sentences:
(13) a. Usually, if a man has a garage with a window, he keeps it closed while he is away. b. Usually, if a man has a garage with a window, he keeps it open while he is away. ( 14) a. Most boys who had a baseball card in their pockets kept it clean while playing in the mud. b. Most boys who had a baseball card in their pockets got it dirty while playing in the mud.
The preferred interpretation of (13.a) has the dependent variable interpreted uni versally; to count as a verifying case, a man that has a garage with a window must keep all the windows closed. The preferred interpretation of ( 13 . b) is existential; it is sufficient that the man keeps at least one of the windows open. Examples ( 14) have the same preferred interpretations. We find that total predicates like closed and clean applied to the dependent variable lead to a universal interpretation, and that partial predicates like op en and dirty lead to an existential interpretation. This phenomenon is quite subtle, and so Yoon (1994) designed a con trolled experiment. 50 subjects were exposed to written test sentences. There were two test sentences per category (total/partial predicates in plural predications, and corresponding total/partial predicates on the dependent variable of a donkey sen tence). No subject was exposed to both members of a pair of test items, that is, no subject had to judge both a sentence like The windows are op en and The windows are closed, in order to prevent subjects fr om attempting to stay consistent with their answers. Furthermore, the test material contained many distractor items. The subjects were instructed to read each sentence separatly and judge whether the sentence could be truthfully asserted in the described situation or not. Here is an example fo r each of the fo ur categories: With 100 answers per category (two sentences and 50 subjects), Yoon obtained the fo llowing result:
(17) a. Predication on sum individual with total predicate: 84% as predicted. Predication on sum individual with partial predicate: 82% as predicted. b. Donkey sentences with total predicate: 74% as predicted.
Donkey sentences with partial predicates: 78% as predicted.
These results are highly interesting. For one thing, (17.a) establishes that predicates like closed and op en are indeed preferably interpreted as total and par tial, respectively. Secondly, (17.b) shows that these predicates lead preferably to a universal or existential interpretation when predicated on the dependent variable of a donkey sentence. Finally, (17.a) and (b) together establish a correlation be tween total/partial predications on sum individuals and universal/existential predi cations on the dependent variable of donkey sentences. Now, the dependent variable in examples (13) and (14) is a singular pro noun, a situation for which the notion of total and partial predicates is not appli cable. So this correlation comes as a surprise for the classical representation of donkey sentences. Perhaps this points to a flaw in the classical representation?
4. Consequences for the Representation of Donkey Sentences Yoon (1994) argues that the correlations in (13) and (14) indeed should lead to a revision of the received representation of donkey sentences. She proposes that the dependent variable should be interpreted as the sum individual that consists of all the individuals that its antecedent can be anchored to. The predicate on the de pendent variable in the nuclear scope then is predicated on this sum indivdual. In case this predicate is a total or partial predicate, it will lead to a universal or exis tential interpretation, respectively. This predicts that (lS.a) has a universal inter pretation, and (19.b) has an existential interpretation.
(18) a. Every boy who had a baseball card kept it clean.
b. Analysis by way of paraphrase: Every boy who had a baseball card kept the baseball card(s) that he had clean. c. The baseball cards that he had were clean. (total/universal) (19) a. Every boy who had a baseball card got it dirty.
b. Analysis by way of paraphrase: Every boy who had a baseball card got the baseball card(s) that he had dirty. b. The baseball cards that he had were dirty. (partial/existential) One problem of this analysis is that the donkey pronoun (here, it) is singu lar, but has to be spelled out by a potentially plural noun phrase. But Lappin (1989) , who proposes a similar representation, argues that this is because the number of the pronoun is triggered by purely syntactic agreement. Independent evidence for that comes from the number of the pronoun in the fo llowing cases: (20) a. Every farm er who owns at least one donkey beats it.
b. Every farmer who owns at most three donkeys beats them.
Another potential problem of this analysis is that it seems to predict that the predicate of the donkey pronoun may be collective, which is clearly not the case:
(2 1) *Every farmer who owns a donkey rounds it up at night.
However, notice that the pronoun it must, of course, accomodate cases in which a farmer just owns a single donkey, and in this case the collective predicate round up could not be applied.
There are a number of proposals fo r the representation of donkey sen tences along the lines indicated here. They are originally motivated by the maxi mality effect in the interpretation of pronouns as in the fo llowing cases (cf. Evans 1980):
Harry owns some donkeys. Tom vaccinated them. :=::: Tom vaccinated all the donkeys that Harry owns.
Theories like Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) do not give us this interpretation of these so-called E-type pronouns. 3 Examples like (22), as well as the universal interpretation of dependent variables, have led to the suggestion of alternative theories (cf. Heim 1990 fo r discussion). For example. Neale (1990) proposes that donkey pronouns are spelled out as numberless definite descriptions derived fr om the syntactic fo rm of the antece dent, essentially similar to the paraphrases in (18) and (19). Problems of this ap proach are that it is unclear how this syntactic copying should work in general, and that we certainly need semantic inferences for anaphora as in Every fa rmer who owns a donkey beats the animal. Lappin (1989) proposes semantic representations of the fo llowing type, where the donkey pronoun refers to the elements in the highlighted intersection. One problem here is that the anaphoric relation between the two highlighted sets in the fo llowing example is not fo rmally captured:
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Chierchia (1992, 1995) proposes that donkey pronouns can be either bound (leading to an existential interpretation) or free (leading to an E-type read ing). Free pronouns denote functions that are contextually supplied\, as illustrated in (24) . A problem with this approach is that there is no theory about how the function f is to be construed. It should also be noted, as Chierchia wants to ac count fo r the existential vs. universal interpretation of the dependent variable, that he does not provide for an explanation of Rooth's Generalization. Lappin and Francez (1994) assume just the functional interpretation But they hold that many functions can be selected, two of them being illustrated in (25) . The problems are similar to Chierchia's theory: No account is given fo r how the functions are construed, and Rooth's Generalization remains unexplained. The dependent variable (y) in the restrictor triggers the fo rmation of an embedded box that contains all the descriptive predicates of which y is an ar gument. We fo rm the sum over y under this description (LY) and introduce a dis course referent Z that is identified with that sum.
(26) Every fa rmer who owned a donkey kept it healthy.
x Z FARMER(X)
In the nuclear scope, the donkey pronoun can only be interpreted via the discourse referent Z. If the nuclear scope contains a total or partial predicate, it is interpreted with the preferences that we have established. So, HEALTHY(Z) will be interpreted as total, leading to a universal interpretation of the dependent variable. Also, no tice that for each instantiation of the independent discourse referent there is a unique instantiation of the dependent discourse referent. This means that we do not have to record, with the quantification symbol =>, which discourse referent the quantifier is supposed to quantify over. 
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However, the assumption of predicate negation does not help in many other cases that are similar to (28) as they express some negation of (27) that is not simply logical negation. Consider the fo llowing cases:
(30) a. Mary believes that the windows are made of security glass. b. Mary doubts that the windows are made of security glass. (3 1) a. Many people believed that the windows were made of security glass. b. Few people believed that the windows were made of security glass.
(30.a) reports a belief of Mary that all the windows are made of security glass, and (b), that none of them is made of security glass. (3 1 .a) says that many people believed that all the windows were made of security glass, whereas (b) says that few people believed that any of them was made of security glass. At least, these seem to be the preferred interpretations. In these examples, the constituent sen tence the windows are made of security glass is preferably understood as involv ing a universal quantification over the windows in the (a) case, and as a (narrow scope) existential quantification in the (b) case. -We find similar tendencies fo r NPs denoting sum individuals in object position:
(32) a. Mary has read the files on her desk.
b. Mary has not read the files on her desk.
(32.a) is preferably understood as saying that Mary has read every file on her desk, whereas (32.b) is preferably understood as saying that Mary has read none of the files on her desk.
Notice that even if we analyze not here as predicate nega tion, pure logic would give us another interpretation, namely, that Mary has not read every file on her desk (i.e., she may have read some). Yoon (1994) included negated and non-negated sentences in the test re ported in section (4) above. Her result for sentences with stative predicates is as fo llows (again, 50 subjects, 2 sentences per category):
(33) a. Non-negated sentences: 90% universal interpretation.
b. Negated sentences: 76% (narr ow scope) existential interpretation.
This correlation has not gone completely unnoticed, as I fo und out re cently. Lappin (1989) argues that plural pronouns and conjunctive NPs in the scope of upward-entailing operators receive a "conjunctive", i.e. universal, inter pretation, and in the scope of downward-entailing operators, a "disjunctive", i.e. existential, interpretation. Lappin considers the fo llowing examples: In each case, the disjunctive or existential interpretation is preferred: (34.a) says that no man fo und any of them, (b) says that no one saw either John or Mary, and (c) says that less than five people wanted either Max or Sally to address the meeting.
4 In all these cases we find the existential interpretation of the NP denot ing a sum individual . The data discussed in this section then lead to the fo llowing observation, which I would like to call Lappin's Generalization:
MANFRED KRIFKA
A non-collective predication P(x) on a sum individual x is preferably interpreted as (i) 'v'y[y s;;; ; x -+ P(y)], if P(x) is in an upward entailing environment, (ii) 3y[y s;;; ; x /\ P(y)], if P(x) is in a downward entailing environment.
The restriction to non-collective predications excludes the application of this principle to sentences like The students gathered or The students did not gather.
A statement like (35) is still a bit unsatisfactory, as it involves a very spe cific interpretation rule just fo r the case of plural predications. We should try to derive Lappin's Generalization from more general principles. Take again example (27) and (28) 
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If we compare the preferred interpretations and the dispreferred interpretations in terms of their logical strength, we arrive at the fo llowing observation: For (36), the preferred interpretation, (36.b), logically entails the dispreferred interpretation, (36.c). Similarly for (37) : The preferred interpretation (37.b) logically entails the dispreferrr ed interpretation (37.c). In general, the preferred interpretations are logically stronger than the dispreferred interpretations. This holds for the other cases we have considered as well. What this suggests is that in predications on sum individuals, the logically stronger interpretation is preferred. More precisely, I would like to propose the fo llowing two hypotheses (38) and (39): (38) If a predicate P applies to a sum individual x, grammar does not fix whether the predication is universal ('dy[ys;;; ; x -+ P(y)]) or rather exis tential (3y[ys;;; ; x /\ P(y)]), except if there is explicit information that en fo rces one or the other interpretation.
Explict information that enforces a particular interpretation could be the presence of a universal quantifier, like all the windows, of a distributive operator, like in are each made of security glass, or interpretations of the predicate P that are lexi cally enforced or situationally preferred, e.g. if P is a total or partial predicate like are clean or are dirty.
(39) If grammar allows fo r a stronger or a weaker interpretation of a struc ture, choose the one that results in the stronger interpretation of the sentence, if consistent with general background assumptions! Lappin's generalization (35) then fo llows from the interpretation rule for plural predicates (38) and the general pragmatic rule (39). The question now is whether these two rules can be independently motivated. The interpretation rule (38) is, in some sense, a null hypothesis. Gramm ar has to specify the truth conditions for P(x) if x is an atomic individual. Further more, it is natural to assume that the truth of P(y), y being a sum individual, will somehow depend on whether P applies to the parts of y. Now, if nothing indicates any particular proportion to which P should apply to the parts of y, then the two natural extreme options are the universal interpretation and the existential inter pretation.
For the pragmatic rule (39) there is some independent evidence. Dalrym ple, Kanazawa, Mchombo & Peters (1994) have proposed the "Strongest Meaning Hypothesis" for reciprocals (see also Kim & Peters 1995 and Winter, this vol ume) . This hypothesis states that reciprocal statements can be interpreted as in volving a whole fa mily of possible interpretations that are related to each other by logical strength, and that the interpretation actually selected is the one that yields the logically strongest truth conditions that are still compatible with the general background knowledge. Two illustrative examples are the fo llowing:
(40) a. The five players know each other.
b. The five players sat alongside each other.
(40.a) selects the logically strongest interpretation of the reciprocal ('every player knows every other player'). This interpretation is physically impossible for (40.b), which settles fo r a weaker interpretation, but still for the strongest possible one, given the circumstances. Interestingly, the judgements change in the way pre dicted here when these sentences are embedded in downward entailing contexts:
(4 1) a. The five players don't know each other. b. Mary doubts that the five players know each other.
These examples preferably express (Mary's belief) that none of the five players knows any other player, which is not just the logical negation of (40.a). This shows that the absolutely weakest interpretation of the reciprocal is selected, which is the strongest one in this context. The pragmatic rule (39) may be related to so-called "R-based Implica tures", cf. Hom (1984). These implicatures state that in certain circumstances, a speaker can derive the strongest possible interpretation that is consistent with what is said and with the the background knowledge. For example, fr om a sen tence like Mary was able to solve the problem we can infer that Mary solved the problem.
Furthermore, (39) seems to be important fo r the interpretation of embed ded questions. Lahiri (1991) has argued that in sentences like Mary mostly knows who passed the exam, the adverb mostly specifies the proportion to which Mary knows the answers to the embedded question. In case no explicit proportion is given, as in Mary knows who passed the exam, the proportion is assumed to be total or universal, that is, Mary knows all the answers. However, notice that a sentence like Mary does not know who passed the exam is typically interpreted as saying that Mary does not know any answer to this question, that is, we find an existential interpretation.
A possible objection against (39) is that it seems to predict that scopally ambiguous sentences like every data set was checked by a student always lead to the interpretation that entails the other interpretations (that is, the wide-scope in terpretation of a student). This is not so. Rule (39) fo rces the strongest interpreta tion that a particular linguistic structure can get. Under the assumption that sco pally ambiguous sentences are disambiguated at some level in the syntax semantics interface, e.g. at a level of Logical Form, scopally ambiguous sentences lead to different structures as the input of interpretation.
One important issue at this point is: At which level is pragmatic strength ening to be evaluated within a structure that allows fo r multiple embeddings? Let us discuss the fo llowing example: Evaluated at S2 ' we would expect the existential interpretation. Evaluated at S l > we would expect the universal interpretation. It appears to me that (37) actually can be understood in either way. This is reminiscent of the flip-flop effects in the licensing of polarity items. However, these effects are limited (cf. Kritka 1995), and we should expect similar limitations in the present case. For example, (37) can be understood as expressing a doubt of Mary with regard to a previously ut tered sentence, S2, which leads to pragmatic strengthening on the level of S2'
A Derivation of Rooth's Generalization
Let us return to the universal and existential interpretations of the dependent vari able of donkey sentences. It should be obvious by now how we can derive Rooth's Generalization fr om Y oon' s representation of donkey sentences and Lappin's Generalization about the interpretation of plural predications. Let me illustrate this. According to Yoon, (43.a) is interpreted as in (b): (43) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. b. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey(s) that he owns.
Grammar leaves it open whether the plural predication beats the donkey(s) that he owns is to be interpreted universally or existentially. The VP argument of every is upward entailing; so pragmatic strengthening leads to the universal interpretation. The fo llowing example is handled in the same way, except that the VP argument of no is downward entailing, which leads to a preference for the (narrow-scope) existential interpretation of the plural predication. These examples show that, in general, Rooth's Generalization can be de rived. We have derived it fr om two independently justified ideas: First, Yoon's representation of donkey sentences that involve plural predications on the depend ent variable, which was motivated by the interpretation of total and partial predi cates. Second, Lappin's Generalization about how plural predications are inter preted in upward entailing and downward entailing contexts. This generalization in turn is a consequence of a plausible assumption about the underspecified inter pretation of predications on sum individuals, and of an independently motivated rule of pragmatic strengthening.
Unfortunately, this is not all there is to say about the universal and exis tential interpretation of the dependent variable of donkey sentences. In the next section, I will mention an independent principle, and in the fo llowing section, I will review a couple of alternative explanations.
7. An Additional Principle: Domain Narrowing It is well known that Rooth's Generalization can be violated in certain cases. Take the fo llowing example by Schubert & Pelletier (1989) , as statement about the be havior of men in a parking lot:
Usually, if a man has a quarter in his pocket, he puts it in the meter.
Clearly, the existential interpretation of the dependent variable is preferred. Barker (1993) has explained this by a phenomenon called domain narrowing. As quantified statements in general, donkey sentences allow fo r an implicit contex tual narrowing of their restrictor. Making such restrictions explicit. a sentence like (45) can be paraphrased as fo llows :
(46) Usually, if a man has a quarter in his pocket (and the parking meter is not broken, th e parking meter is empty, etc. ). he puts it in the meter.
Barker suggests that as soon as a man instantiates the required behavior by putting a quarter fr om his pocket in the meter, the highlighted implicit restriction changes to fa lse, and said man is not required to put more quarters into the meter, even if he has more of them in his pocket. I think that domain narrowing is very plausible, but it is a principle that is orthogonal to Rooth's Generalization. Domain narrowing will, by its nature, ap pear with episodic sentences. and not with statives, while Rooth's Generalization holds for stative predicates as well. It is still unclear, though, how domain narr ow ing of this sort should be integrated in the logical interpretation of quantifiers ..
A Review of Other Suggestions
Kadmon (1990) has proposed that donkey sentences like (l.a,b) with a singular dependent variable come with a uniqueness presupposition, here, that every farmer who owns a donkey owns exactly one donkey. In this case, the universal interpretation and the existential interpretation of the dependent variable collapse into one. But uniqueness can be cancelled, in contrast to bona fide presupposi tions: (47) b. Most Iowa farmers that raise turkeys sell them for Thanksgiving. Barker (1993) suggested that donkey sentences like (l.a,b) rather come with a homogeneity presupposition, here that each farmer that owns a donkey either beats them all, or beats none of them. Again, the universal interpretation and the existential interpretation coincide in such models. But it turns out that homogeneity can be cancelled, hence cannot be a presupposition: (49) Most farmers in the village that own a donkey beat it. But Pedro, who owns two donkeys, beats only one of them.
Another attempt fo r an explanation was put fo rward by Kanazawa (1994) . Sanchez-Valencia (1991) and Dowty (1994) have observed that the monotonicity properties of operators fac ilitate logical inferences. For example, if it is known that a context Xa Y is downward entailing in a, then it will fo llow that, if 13 logi cally entails a, then XaY will logically entail XI3Y. Sanchez-Valencia and Dowty claim that natural language operators are typically upward entailing and down ward entailing because such operators allow for easy computation of logical con sequences. Kanazawa (1994) proposes that dependent variables of donkey sentences are interpreted in a way as to preserve such inference patterns, and hence, to facili-tate the computation of logical entailments. He observes that we readily draw in fe rences like the fo llowing, due to the fact that every, no and some are monotone in their restrictor argument, and own andfeed expresses a subconcept of own.
(50) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. => Every farmer who owns and fe eds a donkey beats it. b. No farmer who owns a donkey beats it. => No farmer who owns and fe eds a donkey beats it.
c. Some farmer who owns and feeds a donkey beats it. => Some farmer who owns a donkey beats it. Now, these inferences only hold under the unversal interpretation of the depend ent variable in (50.a), and under the existential interpretation in (50.b,c). Hence Kanazawa proposes a principle that in a donkey sentence with interpretation Q(A, B), where Q is a quantifier that allows for a upward or donward entailing interpre tation on both arguments, the dependent variable is quantified in such a way (i.e., existentially or universally) that monotonicity inferences are preserved. There are at least two problems to this analysis. One is that there are good arguments not to treat some, as in (50.c), as a quantifier of the same type as every and no. There are differences in the anaphoric potential in these quantifiers; fo r example, the premise of (50.c) can be continued with It likes that, in contrast to the premises of (50.a,b). Quantifiers like some are to be treated as existential quantifiers, not as quantifiers that express a certain relation between two sets.
More seriously, Kanazawa's theory fails to make any prediction for quan tifiers like most or less than 90 percent of the that are neither upward entailing nor downward entailing in their restrictor, although their tendency towards the univer sal or existential interpretation of the dependent variable in donkey sentences is as pronounced. For example, Most fa rmers who own a donkey beat it is most likely interpreted as universal on its dependent variable, and Less than 90 percent of the fa rmers who own a donkey beat it as existential. Rooth's Generalization, and hence the present paper, makes the right predictions in these cases.
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